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When prices hardly matter: 
Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods 
 
Abstract 
This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. 
In these markets a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequences of 
unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines 
of insurance base indemnity on the insured’s actual expenses, i.e., the insured would 
be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. In this setting 
we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on the 
one hand, upon the development of prices and the market structure in markets with 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In 
these markets, which will be referred to as repair markets, a consumer purchases a good or repair 
service to compensate consequences of certain unfavorable events, such as an accident or an 
illness. Examples are segments of the markets for car repair services and rental cars as well as the 
markets for medical services and pharmaceutical products. 
The fact that consumers are insured, would by itself not cause economic problems so long 
as insurance companies are able to write complete contracts assigning indemnity payments 
directly to any possible “state of the world”. Typically, though, the set of potential states of the 
world is rather complex implying that writing complete contracts would either be impossible or 
cause disproportionate transaction costs.
4 For example, a complete contract in auto insurance 
would have to precisely define the indemnity payable in case of any possible damage to the 
involved autos. As the latter is usually not a realistic option, insurance policies in most lines of 
insurance base indemnity on the insured’s actual expenses, i.e., the insured would be partially or 
completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. 
In perfect repair markets the fact that consumers are insured would have no impact on the 
actual prices, since prices correspond to marginal cost. However, as empirical work suggests, 
insurance design has a major impact upon repair markets. Data indicate that repair markets are 
often imperfect and, thus, prices exceed marginal costs. A straightforward rationale for this is 
market power which can result from product differentiation. For the single consumer, transaction 
costs incurred in the process of consuming repair goods often differ across suppliers, for instance 
depending on the location of suppliers relative to the consumer. In the context of car repair shops 
or rental cars, an illustration of this can be seen in spatial preferences. Another example can be 
observed in markets for pharmaceutical products and health services, where market power results 
from consumers’ designated preferences for certain suppliers. Given such preferences, it is an 
important task to analyze the implications of insurance for consumers’ demand decisions in 
imperfect repair markets. 
                                                 
4  See, for example, Anderlini and Felli (1994), Segal (1999), Maskin (2002).   3
An illustrative example – The German car rental market 
It can often be observed that in repair markets price discrimination between insured and 
uninsured consumers exist and that prices are significantly higher for insured consumers. As an 
example for this, consider the German car rental market.  
In this market a major segment of insured consumers can be identified: The business in 
accident substitute rental cars accounts for roughly 30 % of the entire market.
5 Consumers in this 
segment temporarily substitute a vehicle that was damaged in an accident. They are either 
compensated by their collision loss insurer or they have a valid claim for a substitute car against 
the other party or, effectively, the other party’s liability insurer.
6 Therefore, this segment consists 
exclusively of consumers whose rental car expenses are covered by an insurance company, while 
consumers’ expenses in the remaining share of the market are uninsured. 
In the 1990s, differences in rates for substitute and non-substitute rental cars in the German 
market could be easily investigated, as pricing information for these segments were determined 
and published on a regular basis.
7 The data are collected for different car classes and different zip 
code areas and consist of information from the most popular tariffs. The following table lists 
average rates from the years 1997 through 1999 for the most frequently rented car class in 100 
randomly chosen zip code areas. 
                                                 
5   See Bundesverband der Autovermieter e.V. [Association of Car Rental Companies], Autovermietung, Düsseldorf 
1998. 
6   Please note that auto liability insurance (without any coinsurance) is mandatory in Germany. Therefore, in almost 
any case, this liability claim is covered through insurance. 
7   The EurotaxSchwacke GmbH company regularly published a survey concerning the prices for rental cars in 
Germany, which distinguished between the accident substitute business and the so called free business and 
reported them separately.   4
Table 1: Average rates in the German rental car market 1997-1999 
(car class „5“, 100 randomly chosen zip code areas) 
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Source: Schwacke-Bewertung GmbH & Co KG, SchwackeLISTE-Automietpreisspiegel, Osnabrück 1997, 1998, 
1999. 
During the sample period, rates in the substitute car business exceeded the rates for non-
substitute cars by 15.2 – 24.9 %. More precisely, these numbers can be considered lower bounds for 
the actual price differences, as the non-substitute tariffs were adjusted by means of a general 
additional collision coverage component.
9 
Surprisingly, only few theoretical papers so far have dealt with the interdependencies 
between insurance and repair markets. Frech and Ginsburg (1975), for example, address the 
question of how, in a monopolistic health care market, different types of insurance benefits affect 
price and quantity. They find, among other results, that in any case both parameters will increase, 
with prices tending to infinity for the case of complete insurance. However, since, e.g., the 
markets for medical services or car repair services typically have an oligopolistic or atomistic 
structure, the results of Frech and Ginsburg (1975) do not capture the situation in most of the 
repair markets we are interested in. 
                                                 
8   The values given in brackets are the empirical standard deviations. 
9   This extra price component was added, since rates in the German substitute car market generally include liability 
as well as collision and comprehensive coverage, while rates for non-substitute cars often only include liability 
insurance and certain additional partial coverage, but the available data did not include the actual precise range of 
insurance coverage. Therefore, for the non-substitute car rates as given in the table, there is a tendency of 
overstating the correct values.   5
Gaynor et al. (2000), analyze the interdependence between the degree of competition in 
health care markets and the extent of excess consumption due to insurance. Their results indicate 
that even in the presence of insurance-induced changes in price elasticity, consumers benefit from 
increased competition in health care markets. 
The existing related empirical literature, which also for the most part addresses the demand 
for health care and pharmaceutical products, is extensive. Most of the findings are 
straightforward and correspond to the theoretical results mentioned above. For instance, 
Newhouse et al. (1993) found that patients with full insurance coverage used significantly more 
health care than those who had to co-pay directly. (The study also showed that the different 
insurance plans the participating households had been assigned did not significantly affect their 
health situation). Hellerstein (1998) concentrates on a physician’s position as an agent. Even 
though her findings do not indicate that an individual patient’s insurance coverage affects the 
prescription patterns of a particular physician, she shows that the distribution of types of coverage 
among a physician’s patients is important for the likelihood of prescribing generics (as opposed 
to trade-name drugs). In a recent paper, Pavcnik (2002) analyzes how a reduction of insurance 
coverage influences pharmaceutical product prices. Her results show that these prices decrease 
considerably as patients’ out-of-pocket expenses increase. 
Several studies by Feldstein show that physicians in medical markets raise their fees and 
improve their products when insurance coverage becomes broader, and even non-profit hospitals 
respond to an increase in insurance by increasing the sophistication and the price of their service 
(Feldstein 1970, 1971). More importantly and probably somewhat puzzlingly at first glance, 
empirical analysis indicates that a reduction of the actual demand of insurance coverage would 
induce a welfare gain, i.e. individuals purchase too much insurance (Feldstein 1973, the issue 
was revisited by Feldman and Dowd 1991). This is surprising, as one would expect that working 
insurance markets provide the optimal amount of coverage. Feldstein suggests that this is due to a 
prisoner’s dilemma, as “People spend more on health because they are insured and buy more 
insurance because of the high cost of health care”.
10 One of the goals of this paper is to provide a 
theoretical explanation for this finding, which concentrates on the structure of an insurance 
                                                 
10   Feldstein (1973), p. 252.   6
market, where no information asymmetries or transaction costs are present and coverage is 
provided at actuarially fair rates. 
The reason why the interaction between insurance and repair markets has not yet been 
studied more extensively, presumably can be seen in the typical perception of insurance in the 
economics literature: Insurance contracts are usually interpreted as a specific kind of financial 
contract, in which the insured – in return for the premium – acquires a claim upon future state-
contingent payments. Most precisely, this has been stated by Arrow: “insurance is the exchange 
of money now for money payable contingent on the occurrence of certain events” (Arrow, 1965, 
p. 45). According to this view, insurance contracts are considered complete in the sense that the 
amount of indemnity can be directly tied to the occurrence of states of the world. However, as has 
been stated above, this is not what we observe in important lines of insurance, where the insured, 
in case of a loss, receives coverage based upon his or her actual repair expenses. Therefore, these 
insurance contracts are incomplete, as the insurer’s payments are not unambiguously given and, 
in particular, depend on the prices for repair services. 
In this paper, we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, 
on the one hand, upon the development of prices and the number of suppliers in markets with 
insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance 
contracting. To keep things as simple as possible, we assume that no information asymmetries 
exist and that insurance is available at actuarially fair premiums. Frictions, however, exist in the 
repair market. We consider a repair market with product differentiation which provides the single 
supplier with a certain spatial market power. The model framework employed here is based upon 
an approach introduced by Salop (1979). Basically, the focus is on indescribable contingencies in 
insurance. We are interested in the impact of incomplete insurance contracts on repair markets. 
As the introduction of incomplete contracts means a substantial imperfectness and because our 
analysis is supposed to concentrate on this problem, we will abstain from other imperfections in 
the insurance market. 
In contrast to the existing literature, we also study a new aspect of the problem concerning 
the optimal structure of insurance markets. A pareto-efficient insurance contract maximizes the 
expected utility of consumers under further constraints. The main task for the insurer in the 
considered context is to balance the trade off between the risk allocation and the insurance 
induced price effect on the repair market. But the limiting effect of a coinsurance rate on the   7
repair market price level depends on the market share of the offering insurance company. In an 
atomistic market a single insurer’s contract design only has a marginal impact on the repair 
market and its price level. Consequently, the equilibrium coinsurance will increase in the market 
share of a particular insurer or decrease in the number of insurance companies respectively. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In 
Section 3 we present different benchmarks for the following analysis. Section 4 discusses the 
impact of incomplete insurance contracts on the structure of the repair market, while section 5 
addresses effects in the insurance market. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The model framework 
Our analysis focuses on the optimal insurance design and the number of firms in repair markets 
with insured consumers. We assume that consumers have heterogeneous preferences. These 
preferences are interpreted as being caused by consumers’ spatial distribution. We consider n 
suppliers, denoted  n j ,..., 1 =  that offer a good respectively a repair service. Each company offers 
a repair service at the price  j p  and the suppliers compete in prices a la Bertrand. The consumers 
with an initial wealth of  0 w  face the risk of a loss with probability π . In case of a loss the 
suppliers offer one repair unit, which fully restores the loss, but consumers face transportation 
cost t that increases in the distance x to the supplier. The model framework is based upon the 
circular city model of Salop (1979), where consumers are uniformly and continuously distributed 
along a circle with a perimeter equal to  π / 1 .
11 Consumers have a utility function  ()tx w u U − = , 
where the utility is additively separable in the repair service and the transportation costs. w 
represents the final wealth of consumers excluding any transportation cost. The consumers are 
assumed to be risk averse with respect to the repair risk and risk neutral concerning the 
transportation cost. Therefore,  ) (⋅ u  is a twice-differentiable utility function with 
0 ) ( , 0 ) ( < ⋅ ′ ′ > ⋅ ′ u u . In the insurance market m risk-neutral insurers, denoted  m i ,..., 1 = , 
simultaneously offer contracts  () i i i C δ α , =  with a coinsurance rate  i δ  and a resulting indemnity 
                                                 
11   This assumption implies that the ex post size of the repair market, after the realization of losses, is one.   8
of  j i p ) 1 ( δ −  at the fair premium  j i i p ) 1 ( δ π α − ⋅ = . We further assume that consumers suffering 
from a loss always derive a surplus from consuming a unit of the repair good. Exactly one unit is 
purchased. Through these assumptions we abstain from the problem of ex post moral hazard 
(Pauly 1968), as the extent of purchased repair services is independent of the amount of 
coverage. This is plausible in situations where only one repair unit is necessary and over-
consumption has no value for consumers. Assuming that uninsured consumers derive a surplus 
from purchasing the repair service implies that insured consumers with a coinsurance contract  i C  
strictly prefer to demand the service in case of an accident. 
Since in this model market entry and price are decisions variables, but suppliers’ business 
locations (or more general: product differentiation) are not, an assumption is needed concerning 
the post-entry distribution of suppliers on the circle. We assume maximum product 
differentiation, i.e., for the specific model context of this paper, that suppliers are equidistantly 
spread around the circle. This premise is founded on the results of D’Aspremont et al. (1979), 
who have shown that in the Hotelling (1929) linear city framework suppliers would choose 
maximum product differentiation (contrasting Hotelling‘s original results), i.e. they would locate 
their businesses as far from each other as possible. As the persistence of this result for the case of 
insured consumers is not obvious, we address this issue in the Appendix. 
The sequence of the considered game between insurers, consumers and suppliers is as 
follows: At stage 1, each of the m insurance companies offers an insurance contract  i C . Then at 
stage 2, the potential entrants in the repair market simultaneously choose whether or not to enter 
the market. Referring to the maximum differentiation result from the Appendix we presume that 
suppliers that entered are equidistantly distributed on the circle. As we analyze the problem of the 
number of suppliers entering the market, we assume that the potential entrants face fixed entry 
costs of  0 > f . Because of the free entry assumption the equilibrium profit of entering firms is 
zero. Finally, at stage 3 the suppliers that have entered set their prices  j p , given their locations.   9
3. Social optima 
As a reference point for the following analysis, we take a look at different benchmark situations. 
Let us first start with situations where complete insurance contracts are feasible. These contracts 
and the associated indemnity can be conditioned upon any possible state of nature. Under such 
ideal circumstances the optimal insurance arrangement is straightforward: since insurance 
companies can anticipate the (equilibrium market) price for a repair unit, the indemnity 
corresponds to this price. Thus, the repair market is neither affected by insurance contracts nor by 
the structure of the insurance market. 
First Best 
When complete insurance contracts are feasible, a first best risk allocation can be reached via a 
full insurance contract. However, one of the main results of the Salop model is that in equilibrium 
too many suppliers enter the repair market. Thus, when the structure of the repair market is 
endogenous, overriding the Salop competition and vertically integrating the repair market leads to 
a first best situation. Since consumers are fully insured under the first best insurance contract, 
prices are irrelevant from a welfare perspective. The only reason for overriding the competition in 
the repair market is to reduce the number of operating repair service suppliers. A monopoly 
insurer or a coalition of all insurance companies can establish a repair service network with a first 
best number of repair shops which minimize the sum of standing expenses, consumers’ 
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Therefore, the first-best number of suppliers 







= .     (2) 
Second Best 
In a second best situation, complete insurance contracts are still feasible, but due to legal or other 
restrictions, insurance companies are not able to override the competition in the repair market. As   10
in the first best situation, the risk allocation is still first best. However, as a consequence of the 
Salop model in equilibrium too many suppliers enter the market. Again, since insurance contracts 
condition upon the state of nature, the price effect is irrelevant. Only the increased number of 
suppliers leads to a welfare loss compared to the first best situation. 
Third Best 
A further welfare loss is incurred when insurance contracts are incomplete. The optimal 
incomplete insurance contract trades off the insurance-induced price effect on the repair market 
and risk allocation. As we will show in the following sections, the structure of the insurance 
market will have a major impact on the repair market as well as on social welfare. 
 
4. Effects in the repair market 
Starting with the price competition at stage 3, we assume that n suppliers have entered the 
market. In this situation, consumers decide about deterministic outcomes and only those who 
suffered a loss purchase the repair unit. We assume that all consumers accepted the same 
incomplete insurance contract with a strictly positive coinsurance rate ( ) 0 > δ .
12 Because they are 
located symmetrically, we concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium, where all suppliers charge the 
same price  p . Each firm has only two surrounding competitors. In order to derive a single 
supplier’s demand function, let us consider supplier j. A consumer located between supplier j and 
one of its neighbors (offering a repair unit at the price p) at the distance  [] 1 , 0 ∈ x  from supplier j 






 − + = + x
n
t p tx p j
1
δ δ  (3) 
                                                 
12   Obviously,  0 = δ  can never be a part of an equilibrium, because in this case: the consumers’ demand is 
completely price-inelastic, suppliers can charge an infinitely high price and the number of entering supplies also 
tends to infinity. Additionally, the insurance premium would exceed any initial wealth. Using a similar argument, 
we can easily see that there is a critical level of coinsurance  0 > b δ , such that the insured’s budget constraint is 
binding for  b δ δ < . Therefore, a positive coinsurance level,  p δ , such that the insured’s participation constraint 
binds for  p δ δ <  also exists with  b p δ δ ≥ .   11
holds (where t denotes the transportation cost per unit of distance between the consumer 
and a supplier). 
















The transportation cost rate t indicates the suppliers’ market power, as it determines to what 
extent prices of repair services can exceed marginal cost. If a customer is insured and, thus, δ  is 
below one, the market power of repair firms is increased. 
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, (6) 
where c denotes the per-unit cost of providing the repair good. The first order condition for 





+ = . (7) 
The price level in the repair market decreases in the number of entering firms and in the 
coinsurance rate. The number of entering firms is therefore endogenously determined by the 
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. (8) 






* . (9) 
Even without insurance, the number of suppliers in market equilibrium 
* n  is too high, 
compared to the first best optimum (Salop 1979), since 
FB n n >
*  holds. The equilibrium price 
level in the repair market is 
δ
tf
c p + =
* . (10) 
In equations (9) and (10) the case of uninsured consumers refers to  1 = δ . Thus, insurance 
leads to an increase in the number of suppliers as well as in the market price. The intuition behind 
these results is straightforward: The market power of firms is increased by insured consumers. 
This attracts new entrants, which leads to a decrease in profits. Since market entry causes 
additional standing expenses, the zero profit condition implies that prices have to be higher, if 
consumers are insured. 
 
5. Effects in the insurance market 
Let us now concentrate on the third best situation with incomplete insurance contracts. Due to the 
complexity of the states of nature, insurers are unable to fully specify the behavior of customers 
and suppliers in the case of a loss. Consequently, insurance contracts can only be conditioned 
upon the consumer’s demand for the repair good. As a starting point for our analysis, we explore 
the third best insurance contract. In a third best situation a social planner offers incomplete 
contracts with a coinsurance rate 
TB δ . This coinsurance rate trades off the insurance-induced 
price effect and risk allocation. 
Evidently, a monopoly insurer offers the same coinsurance rate as the social planner. Thus, 
in the considered context an insurance monopoly is never inferior to any other market structure. 
However, as we will show in Proposition 1, the equilibrium coinsurance rate will decrease in the 
number of insurance companies. Consequently, the insurance monopoly is even strictly superior 
to an y other market structure.   13
As long as the participation constraint does not bind, the third best coinsurance rate under 
the considered circumstances is specified by the following expected utility maximization 
problem: 








































































































































































































































respectively, where n w denotes the final wealth of consumers in the state of no loss and  l w  
denotes the final wealth in the loss state. 
We know that  0 >










13 The third best insurance contract 
entails less than full coverage, in order to limit the price effect on the repair market. The structure 
of this result is quite similar to what can be observed in standard insurance moral hazard 
                                                 
13  See footnote 9.   14
models.
14 Optimal contracts derived from those model frameworks also entail only partial 
coverage, since, like in our model, a trade-off exists between risk allocation and the avoidance of 
inefficiently high losses. However, while in the moral hazard context these inefficiently high 
losses are due to reduced carefulness as a consequence of asymmetric information, in our 
framework they result only from the coverage-induced increase in prices. 
Since combinations of parameters exist for which the left hand side in (13) is greater than 1, 
we conclude that an interior solution does not always exist. To ensure the existence of an interior 













































































+ −  (15) 
The insurance effect, indemnity less the insurance premium, for a constant price level has 
to exceed the price effect. In other words, for a given loss probability π , production costs c, 
transportations costs t and utility function  () ⋅ u , there will always be a critical coinsurance rate 
such that the impact of a marginal increase in coverage is zero. 
Note that a key difference exists between price increases in repair markets and moral 
hazard. In the latter problem, an optimal insurance contract efficiently solves the incentive 
problem between the two contracting parties and does not have any impact on other contracts. 
However, in the problem studied here each individual incomplete insurance contract affects the 
market price for the repair service and therefore the optimal contracting in other insurance 
relationships, as the following proposition illustrates. 
                                                 
14   See, for example, Shavell (1979).   15
Proposition 1 
The equilibrium coinsurance rate increases strictly in the market share of insurance 
companies. Therefore, an insurance monopoly is strictly superior to any other market structure. 
Proof: see Appendix 
The capability to reduce the price effect on repair markets induced by insured consumers 
declines in the number of insurers, as the fraction of the market affected by a single insurer’s 
coinsurance rate variation decreases. Consider an atomistic market structure. In this situation, 
insurance contracts offered by a single insurer have a negligible impact on the price level on the 
repair market. Therefore, in a competitive insurance market with  2 ≥ m  a problem of 
externalities arises and the symmetric Nash equilibrium is not pareto-optimal. The difference 
between the equilibrium coinsurance rate and 
TB δ is the greater the higher the number of insurers. 
In this sense, a reduction of coverage in a competitive insurance market improves welfare. This 
provides a theoretical explanation for Feldstein’s empirical results. 
On the other hand, a monopolistic insurer completely takes the impact of the level of 
coverage on the repair market price level into account and, thus, offers contracts that entail a 
coinsurance of 
TB δ . Therefore, our model provides an argument for the potential superiority of 
insurance monopolies in certain situations.
15 Additionally, insurance market regulation or a co-
operation between insurance companies can be other beneficial approaches to limit coverage. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In numerous lines of insurance, such as, for instance, health or auto insurance, indemnities are 
based on the actual extent of repair services the insured purchases. Insurance coverage of this 
kind, however, has a major impact upon the repair markets, if these markets are not perfect: The 
                                                 
15  In other contexts authors also have recently argued that insurance monopolies for certain areas achieve better 
results than competitive markets. See, for instance, the empirical findings by Ungern-Sternberg (1996) for the 
case homeowner’s insurance and the discussion of interdependent security problems by Kunreuther and Heal 
(2003). However, as noted by Bonato and Zweifel (2002), monopoly insurers in a moral hazard context may 
mandate an excessive level of loss prevention. Therefore, other effects can limit the superiority of such an 
insurance market structure.   16
price level for repair services as well as the number of suppliers increase. The rising price level 
again affects the optimal insurance contract design, since even in perfect insurance markets with 
complete information, an optimal contract would assign a share of the loss to the insured. It 
cannot be expected, though, that insurers in a competitive market offer the optimal contract, as 
the price increase induced by insurance coverage would not occur only for the single insurer but 
affects all insurers in the market. This means that an externality exists. Therefore, insurers will 
offer contracts with less coinsurance and thus more coverage than socially desirable. 
This paper is a first step toward analyzing the interdependencies between insurance and 
repair markets. Naturally, we had to leave important aspects for future research. From our point 
of view, the following problems could be rather interesting topics to be tackled: 
•  We assume that the product space is completely homogeneous. This means that no product 
is a priori better than the other. This assumption seems adequate e.g. for auto insurance, 
since consumers’ preferences for repair services are mainly determined by availability and 
convenience. On the other hand, patients would often have predetermined preferences for 
certain pharmaceutical products, as in particular copyright-protected products. It therefore 
seems fruitful to also look at repair markets with heterogeneous product spaces. 
•  In this paper, the assumption has been used that the insured is also the consumer for the 
repair service. But this is not useful to characterize liability insurance where the victim, who 
has a claim against the insured, purchases repair services. The victim usually has a legal 
right to be fully compensated, such that in liability insurance the impact on repair markets 
should be even more significant. 
•  When insurers cannot write complete contracts and, thus, the price level of repair services 
rises, a vertical integration of insurance and repair markets seems a straightforward 
approach.
16 An insurer could itself offer certain repair goods or it could co-operate with a 
supplier of these goods. Vertical integration is, e.g., fairly well-developed in the American 
health insurance market (Managed Care), while in the European health sector as well as in 
auto insurance it can only be observed in its infancy. For this reason, the introduction of 
vertical integration seems to be an important extension of this analysis. 
                                                 
16   Vertical integration can also be a powerful tool against ex post moral hazard.   17
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
We consider an insurance market with  1 ≥ m  identical insurers that compete simultaneously in 
contracts. First we look at the effects of a single insurer’s variation of the coinsurance rate  i δ  on 
the repair market.  
A consumer located between suppliers j and j+1 is indifferent between the two competitors, 
if 
) / 1 ( x n t p tx p i j i − + = + δ δ  if the consumer is insured by the insurer i and 
) / 1 ( x n t p tx p i j i − + = + − − δ δ otherwise. 
The fraction of consumers insured by i is 
m
1
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(21) 
As a feature of the symmetric equilibrium with 
* *









































































. (22)   19
The case  1 = m  (22) corresponds to (13). Obviously, the right hand side of (22) increases in 
m for a given level of coinsurance.                      q.e.d. 
 
 
Insurance and Product choice 
In the following we will analyze suppliers’ differentiation decisions. We consider, in the spirit of 
Hotelling (1929) and D’Aspremont et al. (1979), a linear city model. Consumers are uniformly 
distributed along the interval of the length of 1. 
We want to concentrate on the impact of the insurance framework on suppliers’ product 
choice. Therefore, in this section we abstain from any market entry decisions of the suppliers and 
a detailed analysis of the insurance market. Hence, it is assumed that all consumers purchase an 
insurance contract with the same coinsurance rate  i i ∀ = δ δ . For the sake of simplicity, we 
consider the linear city model of Hotelling (1929) with only two suppliers  ) 2 ( = n  and quadratic 
transportation costs of t per unit of length.
17 The suppliers play a two stage game in which they at 
first simultaneously choose their locations  ) , ( b a  and afterwards their prices  j p . Firm 1 is located 
at the point  0 ≥ a  and firm 2 at  ) 1 ( b − , where we set  0 ≥ b  and, without loss of generality, 
0 1 ≥ − − b a . The demand functions of the suppliers are 
() ( )
() b a t
p p b a
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17   This assumption is only used throughout this section of the paper because, since D’Aspremont et al. (1979) have 
shown, the assumption of linear transportation costs within the linear city model under certain circumstances can 
lead to the non-existence of a market equilibrium.   20
Each company maximizes the profit function  j Π  
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. (26) 
We can solve the two stage decision problem by means of backward induction. At stage 2 
the suppliers choose the Nash equilibrium prices 
*
j p  for given locations  ) , ( b a , which result from 




















































































































respectively.   21
The equilibrium price level in the repair market increases with a declining coinsurance rate 
δ , and the insurance design has a decisive impact on the price level in the repair market. 
Henceforth, we deal with the optimal product choice of the suppliers at stage 1. For that reason 
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and 
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1 , (33) 
where we can distinguish the demand and the strategic price effect of a variation of the product 
choice. Using (23), (29) and (30), the demand effect is 
( )
























Since we deal with a symmetric problem, the insurance design has no impact on the 
demand effect for both suppliers. Finally, using (23) and (30), we have to verify the leverage of 
insurance coverage on the strategic effect 



















































Apparently, we obtain the same result that the insurance arrangement has no impact on the 
strategic effect, and therefore on the suppliers product choice. Since the mark-up  ) (
*
1 c p −  is 
positive, 0 / 1 < Π da d  holds, which leads to the maximal differentiation result of D’Aspremont et 
al.  (1979).                        q.e.d.   22
References 
Anderlini, L. and L. Felli, 1994, Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 1085 – 1124. 
Arrow, K.J., 1965, Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing, Yrjö Johnsson Lectures, Helsinki. 
Bonato, D. and P. Zweifel, 2002, Information about Multiple Risks: The Case of Building and 
Content Insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance 69: 469 – 487. 
D’Asprememont, C., J. Gabszewicz, and J.-F. Thisse, 1979, On Hotelling’s “Stability in 
Competition”, Econometrica 47: 1145 – 1151. 
Feldman, R. and B. Dowd, 1991, A New Estimate of the Welfare Loss of Excess Health 
Insurance, American Economic Review 81: 297 – 301. 
Feldstein, M.S., 1970, The Rising Price of Physicians’ Services, Review of Economics and 
Statistics 52: 121 – 133. 
Feldstein, M.S., 1971, Hospital Costs Inflation: A Study in Nonprofit Price Dynamics, American 
Economic Review 61: 853 – 872. 
Feldstein, M.S., 1973, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, Journal of Political 
Economy 81: 251 – 280. 
Frech, H.E. and P.E. Ginsburg, 1975, Imposed Health Insurance in monopolistic markets: a 
theoretical analysis, Economic Inquiry 13: 55 – 70. 
Gaynor, M., D. Haas-Wilson and W.B. Vogt, 2000, Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral 
Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets, Journal of Political 
Economy 108: 992 – 1005. 
Hellerstein, J.K., 1998, The Importance of the Physician in the Generic versus Trade-Name 
Decision, RAND Journal of Economics 29: 108 – 136. 
Hotelling, H., 1929, Stability in Competition, Economic Journal 39: 41 – 57.   23
Kunreuther, H. and G.M. Heal, 2003, Interdependent Security, The Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 26: 231 – 249. 
Maskin, E., 2002, On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts, European Economic 
Review 46: 725 – 733. 
Newhouse, Joseph P. and the Insurance Experiment Group, 1993,. Free for All? Lessons from the 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Pauly, M.V., 1968, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, American Economic Review 58: 
531 – 537. 
Pavcnik, N., 2002, Do pharmaceutical prices respond to patient out-of-pocket expenses? RAND 
Journal of Economics 33: 469 – 487. 
Salop, S., 1979, Monopolistic Competition with outside goods, Bell Journal of Economics 10: 
141 – 156. 
Segal, I., 1999, Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts, Review 
of Economic Studies 66: 57 – 82., 
Shavell, S., 1979, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 93: 541 – 
562. 
Ungern-Sternberg, T. von, 1996, The limits of competition: Housing insurance in Switzerland, 
European Economic Review 40: 1111 – 1121.  
Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 
 
No 14:  Martin Nell, Andreas Richter, Jörg Schiller, When prices hardly matters: 
Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods, January 2005. 
No 13:   Jörg Schiller, Versicherungsbetrugs als ökonomisches Problem: Eine 
vertragstheoretische Analyse, July 2004. 
No 12:  Martin Nell, Andreas Richter, Catastrophic Events as Threats to Society: Private and 
Public Risk Management Strategies, January 2004, erscheint in: Frenkel, M., Hommel, 
U., Rudolf, M. (eds.): Risk Management: Challenge and Opportunity, 2nd ed., Berlin 
Heidelberg. 
No 11:   M. Martin Boyer, Jörg Schiller, Merging Automobile Insurance Regulatory Bodies: 
The Case of Atlantic Canada, November 2003, erschienen in: Assurances et Gestion 
des Risques, 72. Jg. (2004), S. 57 – 89. 
No 10:   Martin Nell, Andreas Richter, Improving Risk Allocation Through Cat Bonds, 
November 2002, erschienen in: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance – Issues and 
Practice, 29. Jg. (2004), S. 183 – 201. 
No 9:   Klaus Bender, Andreas Richter, Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko 
in der Rückversicherung, October 2002, erschienen in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Versicherungswissenschaft, 92. Jg. (2003): S. 483 – 506. 
No 8:  Jörg Schiller, The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems, October 2002.  
No 7:  Martin Nell, Jörg Schiller, Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten von 
Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie, May 2002, erschienen in: 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, 91. Jg. (2002), S. 533 – 556. 
No 6:  Walter Karten, Ökonomische Aspekte einer EU-Richtlinie zur 
Versicherungsvermittlung, January 2002, erschienen in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Versicherungswissenschaft, 91. Jg. (2002), S. 43 – 60. 
No 5:  Andreas Richter, Jochen Ruß, Tax Arbitrage in the German Insurance Market, 
December 2001, erschienen in: Blätter der Deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Versicherungsmathematik, 25. Jg. (2002), S. 659 – 672. 
No 4:   Martin Nell, Staatshaftung für Terrorrisiken?, Dezember 2001, erschienen in: ifo 
Schnelldienst, 54. Jg. (2001), Heft 24, S. 6 – 9.  
No 3:  Andreas Richter, Moderne Finanzinstrumente im Rahmen des Katastrophen-Risk-
Managements – Basisrisiko versus Ausfallrisiko, September 2001, erschienen in: 
Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, 56. Jg. (2004), S. 99 – 121. 
No 2:  Martin Nell, Managed Claims: Zur Notwendigkeit einer vertikalen Integration von 
Versicherungs- und Reparaturleistungen, August 2001, erschienen in: Zeitschrift für 
betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, 53. Jg. (2001), 47. Sonderheft, S. 207 – 231. 
No 1:   Martin Nell, Andreas Richter, The Design of Liability Rules for Highly Risky 
Activities – Is Strict Liability the Better Solution?, June 2001, erschienen in: 




For orders please contact / Kontaktadresse für Bestellungen: 
 
Prof. Dr. Martin Nell 
Geschäftsführender Direktor des 














Mit freundlicher Unterstützung des 
Vereins zur Förderung der Versicherungswissenschaft in Hamburg e.V. 
 